Notes for session 4: Moral Economies
The readings for this week are centered around the theme of moral economy. Bloch and Parry problematize the importance given to money in classical literature as the key factor in transforming a “traditional” social order, which is portrayed to be based on such features as strong social bonds and a gift economy to a “modern” one characterized by individualization, atrophy of moral economy and a commodity economy. In doing so, they highlight the dynamics of exchange in pre-monetarist societies and point to the culturally specific meanings that are associated with money in these societies. Similarly, Zelizer highlights how the symbolism associated with money at the time of death, was exploited in order to market life insurance, a commodity in the United States. In doing so, monetary transactions (like the sale of insurance) take on culturally specific meanings. Rudnyckyj takes these ideas forward by highlighting through the case of Islamic finance that, what is considered sacred is itself highly contested within a specific culture. Robbins draws a parallel between Maussian theory of reciprocity as a foundational social form to that of Hegel’s theory of recognition, making recognition a key term in our understanding of the motivations for and moral bases of exchange. Thompson sketches a history of food riots in 18th century England and nuances our understanding of a moral paternalistic model of subsidies, the failure of which led to rioting. Based on these readings, the following questions are given as pointers for discussion:
Questions
What sort of cultural dynamics of exchange and circulation existed in pre-monetised societies such as Tiv? How do these dynamics influence the symbolic meanings given to money?
What distinguishes short term economic cycle from the long term cosmic order in economic exchange? How is this distinction further elaborated in Parry’s and Fuller’s chapters?
In the case of life insurance in the United States, what are the conditions and the context within which commodity transactions begin to get sacralised?
How do certain notions of Islamic finance overturn dominant distinctions between rationality and religiosity?
How does Thompson draw a historical distinction between a prevailing moral economy and the new ‘Smithian’ economy that replaced in by the end of 18th century?
Urapmins consider emotions central to re creating recognition in a relationship. How does is relate to the larger question of recognition in a capitalist society?
Sanam and Nafis
The readings for this week are centered around the theme of moral economy. Bloch and Parry problematize the importance given to money in classical literature as the key factor in transforming a “traditional” social order, which is portrayed to be based on such features as strong social bonds and a gift economy to a “modern” one characterized by individualization, atrophy of moral economy and a commodity economy. In doing so, they highlight the dynamics of exchange in pre-monetarist societies and point to the culturally specific meanings that are associated with money in these societies. Similarly, Zelizer highlights how the symbolism associated with money at the time of death, was exploited in order to market life insurance, a commodity in the United States. In doing so, monetary transactions (like the sale of insurance) take on culturally specific meanings. Rudnyckyj takes these ideas forward by highlighting through the case of Islamic finance that, what is considered sacred is itself highly contested within a specific culture. Robbins draws a parallel between Maussian theory of reciprocity as a foundational social form to that of Hegel’s theory of recognition, making recognition a key term in our understanding of the motivations for and moral bases of exchange. Thompson sketches a history of food riots in 18th century England and nuances our understanding of a moral paternalistic model of subsidies, the failure of which led to rioting. Based on these readings, the following questions are given as pointers for discussion:
Questions
What sort of cultural dynamics of exchange and circulation existed in pre-monetised societies such as Tiv? How do these dynamics influence the symbolic meanings given to money?
What distinguishes short term economic cycle from the long term cosmic order in economic exchange? How is this distinction further elaborated in Parry’s and Fuller’s chapters?
In the case of life insurance in the United States, what are the conditions and the context within which commodity transactions begin to get sacralised?
How do certain notions of Islamic finance overturn dominant distinctions between rationality and religiosity?
How does Thompson draw a historical distinction between a prevailing moral economy and the new ‘Smithian’ economy that replaced in by the end of 18th century?
Urapmins consider emotions central to re creating recognition in a relationship. How does is relate to the larger question of recognition in a capitalist society?
Sanam and Nafis
Hi,
ReplyDeleteThank you for the notes. I havent managed to get through all the readings yet but Zelizer's paper immediately struck a chord with me.
Seems like many issues in heritage management originate in / are influenced by different sociological theories? For example, we assign values to a site based on which we assess its (relative) cultural significance and then designate it heritage. There's always an underlying principle? that assigning economic value to a cultural site / object is a huge no-no as it would reduce something sacred to the profane.
On the other hand in reality (potential) economic value of a site is used as a bargaining tool to promote the cause of a site getting designated as heritage.
Further, the long cherished notion of authenticity (i.e. retaining original fabric of a site / object) as the ultimate quest in conservation. The assumption being the more authentic an object or site, the more sacred it is. As new material or designs get incorporated in its repair the more profane it gets.
Krupa
I am posting some notes I wrote for this class; I thought I had uploaded them before but I don't see them here now, sorry!
ReplyDeleteNotes on session 4: Moral economies
The Introduction to the Browne and Milgram volume by Browne (not assigned but do skim through it) contains a good overview of some of the literature we have covered as well as a critique of the dualistic thinking that permeates much of the early work on exchange and value. Browne questions the implicit dichotomy between individual self-interest and collective values (or ‘morality’) that stems from Mauss and other early social theorists and continues to be reproduced in contemporary critiques of neoliberalism. The opposition in much anthropological work between ‘moral economies’ (i.e., pre-capitalist modes of association) based on sharing, reciprocity and mutuality, and market systems or capitalist exchange relations, does not provide a sound theoretical basis for understanding contemporary economies. She argues instead that ‘all economies are moral economies’, and suggests that we need to re-look at ideological debates around western capitalism and the practices of Wall Street finance that tag them as inherently unethical or amoral, given that they are also ideologically framed by arguments about the larger good of society and individual freedom.
Questions: How does Browne define ‘morality’ here? Does her discussion of ‘morality and economy’ not reproduce the ‘economy/ culture’ distinction that she and others are trying to critique?
The chapter by Robbins provides a prescient re-reading of Mauss by developing the idea (derived from Hegel) that mutual recognition is central to social life and arguing that this is what reciprocity or ‘gift’ exchange is all about. He revives the much criticised gift-commodity dichotomy, distinguishing between ‘economies of mutual recognition’ and ‘those that are set to maximize individual acquisition’. Through examples from his fieldwork among the Urapmin of New Guinea, he provides an ‘emic’ account of their gift exchange practices (contra the structuralist approach of Levi-Strauss and much anthropological analysis), highlighting the ‘emotional’ motivations for gift-giving – expressed feelings of ‘shame’ and ‘anger’ that signal lack of recognition or social rupture. For the Urapmin, exchange (rather than speech or other social practices) is the fundamental way mutual recognition is created and sustained. This cultural system is quite incompatible with the logic of capitalist exchange and accumulation, as the example of their negotiations with a mining company shows. For them, ‘development’ should expand their capacity to create relations of recognition through exchange, whereas a market transaction in which they receive money for goods in a one-off exchange does not create that possibility. In the end, Robbins raises the question, ‘Is there, or should there be, a place for recognition within the economic sphere in capitalist cultures?’. To consider this question, he briefly discusses the debate around Fraser’s theory that political demands for recognition lie outside economic relations, which cannot create such a moral imperative. But in this discussion, is he not reproducing the culture/ economy dichotomy that others have tried to demolish?
The paper by Rudnyckyj illustrates the theme of ‘economy and morality’ by delving into debates among ‘experts’ who are invested in creating and sustaining ‘Islamic’ forms of finance and economic practices. Morality of a specific kind lies at the centre of these discussions and experiments – one that aims to promote the larger social good and adhere to a shared system of religious ethics, against the narrow self-interest of individuals or excessive profit-making by other agencies. Yet Islamic finance is squarely embedded in commercial life, its prescriptions perhaps deriving from economic practices of Arab traders in previous eras. So it is not morality opposed to ‘the economy’ but an attempt to govern economic practices through a particular ethical code. More important, Rudnyckyj argues that Islamic finance is tightly entangled with contemporary neoliberal capitalism. His analysis of the debates around particular banking practices shows that proponents of Islamic finance are also driven by the hegemonic ‘imperative of economic rationalization that undergirds conventional finance’, which then becomes a constant ‘object of reflection by Islamic finance practitioners’. While its proponents engage with ‘conventional finance’ in different ways, they cannot escape from this larger discursive universe. Rudnyckyj shows that ‘Islamic finance is always already defined in opposition to conventional finance and ... market reason often frames the outlook and actions of Islamic finance professionals as they seek to make Islamic finance an alternative means for the provision of capital’. The larger aim of the paper is to show how ‘economic subjects’ are created, in diverse sites, through such reflexive economic practices as well as larger ‘disciplinary’ or ‘state effects’ – ‘the reflexive relationship between the production of expert knowledge and the world that that knowledge represents and diagnoses’. He employs the idea of ‘economy in practice’ to highlight the reflexivity inherent in these debates and practices.
ReplyDeleteAn interesting point for this seminar is that regardless of how Islamic finance is specifically defined and operationalised by various experts, the ‘reformers’ promote practices that are seen to ‘enhance social integration’ such as ‘ethical investments’ that ‘share risk’. Here moral or ethical economic practice is not opposed to individual self-maximisation, but it does prioritise the larger social good. Commercial activity is sanctioned and promoted but it not undermine the social fabric. Rudnyckyj’s argument thus addresses ‘one of the central problems that has long preoccupied economic anthropology – around the universality of economism, whether market reason is ‘embedded’ in society, and whether self-interest and rational choice are basic attributes of human beings. However, he points out that anthropology recently has been more concerned with the ‘norms and knowledge through which the human is created rather than on a search for its essential nature’ – hence he advocates this ‘economy of practice’ approach.
Question: How does Rudnyckyj’s basically Foucaultian approach contribute to or critique earlier anthropological theorizations of ‘economic’ practices and the debate on individual choice and self-interest versus ‘social economies’? Does this focus on the historicity and situatedness of capitalism and its diverse practices, and ways in which economic subjects are produced, help us to move beyond the terms of the earlier debates?
-Carol
The chapter by Robbins provides a prescient re-reading of Mauss, focusing on the idea (derived from Hegel) that mutual recognition is central to social life, and arguing that this is what reciprocity or ‘gift’ exchange is all about. He revives the much criticised gift-commodity dichotomy in order to suggest that there is indeed something distinctive about ‘gift economies’, which also provides a critique of the Hobbesian notion of individual self-interest as the basic driving force of human society. Robbins distinguishes between ‘economies of mutual recognition’ and ‘those that are set to maximise individual acquisition’, and through examples from his fieldwork among the Urapmin of Highlands New Guinea, shows how they are incompatible cultural systems. Contra the structuralist approach of Levi-Strauss, he provides an ‘emic’ account of their gift exchange practices focusing on emotional motivations – expressed feelings of ‘shame’ and ‘anger’ that signal lack of recognition or social ruptures. In this culture, gifting is the way in which mutual recognition is created and sustained. Both ceremonial exchange and ‘everyday exchange’ are ‘crucial to their sense of personhood and the social relatedness upon which that sense of personhood is based’. This cultural system is quite incompatible with the logic of capitalist exchange and accumulation, as the example of their negotiations with a mining company shows. For them, ‘development’ should expand their capacity to create relations of recognition through exchange, whereas a market transaction in which they receive money for goods in a one-off exchange does not create that possibility. In the end, Robbins raises the question, ‘Is there, or should there be, a place for recognition within the economic sphere in capitalist cultures?’. To consider this question, he briefly discusses the debate around Fraser’s theory that political demands for recognition lie outside economic relations, which cannot create such a moral imperative. Robbins suggests that Fraser’s argument reflects western ideology rather than grounded research on economic practices.
ReplyDeleteRobbins is addressing a key theme of 1970s and 1980s anthropology broadly labelled ‘culture and political economy’ – what happens to precapitalist societies or non-monetary economies when they get entangled in the money economy or capitalist relations of production? This question is taken up by Parry and Bloch in their Introduction to Money and the Morality of Exchange, where they critique the gift/ commodity dichotomy. They also criticise the simplistic notion that money is everywhere regarded as an all-powerful force that inexorably undermines traditional economic practices based on reciprocity (here they critique both Marx and Simmel), drawing on Bohannon’s classic work on the Tiv. It is not money itself that brings about the transformations described by so many anthropologists, but incorporation into a wider system of exchange and production, usually induced by colonial rule or the activities of traders and other agents from outside. Money symbolises this system, but does not exhaust it. Also, money cannot be equated with capitalism as it existed in pre-capitalist / peasant economies as well, albeit usually confined to particular ‘spheres of exchange’. Their main point is that money carries different meanings in different cultures, and these meanings can only be understood in relation to the larger system of symbols and practices in which it circulates (here they also critique Taussig’s thesis in The Devil and Commodity Fetishism). They suggest that anthropological interpretations of negative symbolic evaluations of money, which equate it with capitalist relations of production and oppose it to ‘morality’ or culturally valued practices, simply reflect our own (i.e., western) culturally specific opposition between the sphere of kinship/ morality / social obligations and that of commerce and commodity exchange. The authors shift focus to the meanings of different transactional orders within which money may circulate, and discern a general pattern that emerges from diverse ethnographic examples – a distinction between short-term transactional orders for individual gain, and longer-term cycles of exchange which are oriented towards reproduction of the social or cosmic order. These cycles everywhere are kept distinct and hierarchised: the long-term is evaluated positively in terms of sacredness, morality, etc, hedged around by rituals and proscriptions, while short-term cycles give scope for individual competition and self-aggrandisement. The two spheres are also articulated with each other, for long-term reproduction cannot take place without production of subsistence or objects of wealth through short-term cycles of production and accumulation. They note that every society has procedures for converting goods derived from short-term cycle into the long-term transactional order, e.g., ill-gotten wealth can be purified by being pushed into religious cycles of exchange as in donations to temples. Further, Parry and Bloch suggest that the relationship between the two orders ‘forms the basis for a symbolic resolution of the problem posed by the fact that transcendental social and symbolic structures must both depend on, and negate, the transient individual’ (i.e., the fundamental sociological problem of structure/ agency or determinism versus free will). The chapter provides a crtitique of the strong substantivist position, which holds that individualistic rational action is found only in market societies: instead, all societies make space for individual self-interest and acquisition, but such activities are kept separate from those associated with more highly valued long-term social reproduction.
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