Chu review - folder link

Hello everyone,
You can access the Chu reviews in the shared folder below.
Regards
Krupa

https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0B80EssmI64t4Rnh5dGRxZUI3Ulk&usp=sharing

Notes on Session 14: Circulation of substances: body, relationality, personhood

The readings, together, bring focus to the body, and ideas of personhood, and some of the fundamental epistemological problems it has created for the ‘Western’ secular systems of knowledge, particularly with respect to science and law.  The body becomes a source of tension and contestation for these domains particularly because ideas of ‘personhood’ come to be located in its biological substratum, substances, and processes, in a bid to delink it from earlier religious and non-material explanations, as Farman suggests. However, while both science and law base their practices on a materialist conception of the person/self, with science (and/or law) not having been able to go the full distance in explaining phenomena such as consciousness, free will, reason, morality, Farman explains that it has resulted in the development of divergent conceptions of the person (i.e., materialist- scientific, and rationalist-legal, which itself is based on non-materialist assumptions), which come into contestation in the practice of science and law. Within the domain of the everyday, these differences constantly bring challenges and questions on how to conceptualise persons and the relationships between them (e.g., the relation between the body and body-parts; their partitioning; whether individual organs/substance have the same status and rights as the whole body, or constitute the person in the same way that the whole does; whether miniscule substances from the body are enough to answers questions of cultural variation, etc. These various questions come up in the light of practices such as cryogenics discussed by Farman; organ donation, discussed by Scheper-Hughes;blood donation discussed by Carsten, and SNPs by Reddy). They also throw up questions on ‘rights’ (e.g., rights over the body and the knowledge that may be determined from its, as discussed by Reddy in describing the HGDP and HapMap project). Within these contexts made possible by scientific advancements, the body is constantly imbricated in ethical dilemmas over the capitalist / neoliberal exploitation of persons, and the commodification of the self, which all throw light on the social-political constitution of identities and status of personhood, unlike what materialist conceptions of science would like to believe. They also raise metaphysical questions about what can be accepted as a ‘free gift’, under such conditions of exploitation (not only of third world, poor populations as in the case of organ donation discussed by Scheper-Hughes, but also in the case of more elite and educated subjects, such as the Indian gujaratis discussed by Reddy, who may be subjected to a restricted access to the knowledge derived from their own bodily substances).

What seems to appear strongly across these set of articles that discuss the commodification of the body in different ways, is the way in which law and science are forced to engage with alternate concepts of the ‘gift’ (as gift of ‘greater good’, gift of  knowledge or gift of life), within these gray areas, where science, yet, has no answers (e.g., the possibility of immortality with cryoscience, or the knowledge to be gained from HapMap), and where the law has, yet, no object/subject to regulate (e.g., the head, detached from the body, which is seen to contain all information vital to living, as discussed by Farman). Thus, in this context, as Farman, Scheper-Hughes, and Reddy show, science constantly skirts around the edges of law, leading to a constant making and re-making of itself, as well as of law (based on ‘bio-ethics’), as Reddy argues, challenging the Western myth of  the ‘gift’ as ‘pure’, itself.

The idea of the gift appears in these new configurations of bio-ethics as a gift of life (e.g., in the organ-donation case or cryogenics case), or as a ‘greater good’ through a gift of knowledge (as in the HapMap case). This idea of genetic mapping and organ donation as a gift itself needs to be invoked in order to hide its commercial and ethical implications. However, this idea of the gift is also not the one that is held by the West that separates the person and thing, and understands the gift  to be wholly ‘pure’ and unreciprocated. Rather, only by drawing on alternate conceptions of the gift as not ‘pure’, but ‘unencumbered’ in its circulation, as not ‘free’, but ‘ought to be’, and linking this to the idea of science as not free, but ought to be, can legal issues, problems of bio-ethics, and the demand and supply for commercial transactions based on the body be managed, and a motivation for sacrifice for the larger good be created. The larger concerns of ethics (understood as general principles that must guide human behaviour on matters such as representation of knowledge, right to knowledge, the inherent dangers and risks of such research, or consequences of these scientific practices) can then give way to moral concerns (understood as local ways of being and worldviews that inform action). Thus, addressing ethical questions can become questions of research design and sample efficacy, ethical protocols for dealing with human cases can be addressed by partitioning the body (with individual parts not receiving the full status of the whole), and practices such as organ trafficking can completely escape questions about the power differentials and exploitation couched within medico-legal definitions and frameworks of the body that don't take into account the social relations that make up the person, and his ‘free will’.  

In a slightly different vein, but still drawing on these questions of the materiality of the body and its relation to the self, seeking to understand how blood as a bodily substance is( or is not) linked to kinship systems, Carsten shows us how bodies are mutable as are the relationships between them as persons.The transfer of particular body substances can mark the boundaries of relationality( thus, concerns of incest may be raised if children who have breastfed from the same mother seek to marry later and deep discomfort arises when bodily fluids are transferred outside of permissible domains as in the making of ‘mommy cheese’).  Blood as a substance whose transfer may occur in the everyday as well as on ritual occasions or as a marker of sacrifice lends itself to several medical, political and religious associations.  Given the multi-layered entanglements of the act of donating blood, it seems impossible to separate out the altruistic from the instrumental. Considering blood as a substance that moves between domains that are otherwise kept separate, she compares it to two non-bodily substances that share the property- money and ghosts. As blood cannot sustain life by itself, ghosts are ‘incompletely dead’. With money, blood shares the association of traversing domains as well as holding metaphorical potential to represent life and vitality.  Materiality of bodily substances( softness, fluidity, contexts of occurrence) is important in invocations of relationality and yet, this does not mean the registers of nature and law( or substance and code as proposed by Schneider) are clearly distinguishable in practice. Even if blood as a metaphor of relationality is used in diverse cultures with considerable consistency, Carsten asks for a reflective anthropological engagement with the specificities of locution in the usage of phrases such as ‘blood-relative’ or ‘blood-relations’.

   Finally, taking a slightly different route, Weston attempts to examine what the extension of metaphors drawn from the body/blood do/can do in informing our understanding and legitimising actions within the realm of the socioeconomic. Weston argues that for modern capitalist theories, there has never been a question about whether the economy is characterised by flows, but always about how best to capture this and its political implications.Drawing attention to how knowledge of the blood and circulation is drawn as a metaphor, analogy, synedoche, in conceptualising the economy, he points to how the economy is always conceptualised as a living, self regulating organism, that must be brought back to health, stimulated after a cardiac arrest, must be pumped with stimulus packages, in order to keep it fit, and alive. In drawing comparisons, he points to how ‘cadavers’, ‘corpses’, and ‘death’ never frame the understanding, even while alternate conceptions of ‘purging’ (drawn from Galenic understanding of circulation) may be used as a way forward to recovery. In this myth of a cyclic, self-recovering system that is created, what is hidden is often the violence and blood-shed that is left in the aftermath of economic expansion, foregrounding the economy as ‘lifeblood’ alone. The power of this metaphor lies in the manner in which our naturalised understanding of blood and the circulatory system has also naturalised our understanding of the economy, and the manner in which its imposition on to the economic provides a constant sense of flows and vitality attributed to the economic. However, drawing attention to  the meta-materiality of these metaphors, as in the case of the Thailand Red Shirt protesters, who sought to purge the government of its excesses after the Asian Financial crisis, he also points to the alternate possibilities of engagement opened up by the use of such metaphors, coupled with a careful anthropological analysis.

Thus, the readings together raise certain central questions about personhood, examining what constitutes a person and how this is related to the materiality of the body. Within the secular tradition of science and law, the question largely remains unresolved- with the ‘non-material’ being central to the epistemologies that create the secular person, and the hope to find it within the materiality of the body( as in the case seeing the brain as the center of preservation of personhood). Discourses of the body, which are articulated within the tradition that seeks to overcome the cartesian dualism finds itself located firmly within it. To understand gifts ‘from’ and ‘of’ the body requires again the resolution of the question of how the person may be distinguished from the body, and if at all such a distinction is possible. If gifts embedded within societies are never really ‘free’, how does the person(constituted, at least in part, by the body) seek social relationships through gifts?

- Savitha and Maithreyi

Class discussion- The gift today

In this seminar, modern manifestations of dan, both as individual philanthropic initiatives and corporate social responsibility, were discussed.

We began the discussion by considering whether all actions are embedded in instrumental rationality. However, we realised that instrumental rationality is itself embedded in culture. Thus, Bornstein’s reading of Weber seemed misplaced because Weber had also shown how instrumentality cannot be extracted from culture or religion. It is this cultural logic of instrumentality that is of interest to the anthropologist. Rather than individual motivation to engage in acts of philanthropy, it is the social contexts within which philanthropy is performed that is of interest to anthropology.

A question that emerged during the discussion was why there had been such a plethora of anthropological writing on Hindu dan when all religions encourage charity in different forms. This could be a product of early Sociology of India which saw caste and hierarchy based on notions of purity and pollution as fundamental structures within Indian society. These notions of purity and pollution perhaps influenced  how dan was viewed. 

The class also spent some time trying to understand how the dan of bio-medical substances is tied to notions of purity-pollution. Assuming caste is ‘carried in one’s blood’, how does pollution not pass through blood transfusion? Early anthropological work had assumed caste to be a fixed identity. However, the practice of dan in bio medical substances seems to suggest that caste is a more fluid entity as demonstrated by later ethnographic work. In this context, the class also raised the recent news of ‘re-conversions’ to Hinduism and the ability to choose one’s caste.

A question was raised about the difference between dan and seva. Is the distinction that of caste? The class did consider the question of whether dan as a category of anthropological inquiry was over determined. Did anthropologists hope to find the ‘pure gift’, despite recognising its non-existence, through dan? In this context, the class also considered the fact that Bornstein in particular maybe doing ex post facto rationalisation of kanya dan/rakta dan.

We also discussed the emergence of newer forms of dan through the internet. At a time when people are not embedded in traditional religious systems, they seek solutions on the internet to understand ‘correct’ practice of dan.

In understanding newer forms of gift, Cross considered the value of the corporate gift to workers. Seeking to look at practice within discourses, he unpacked different narratives to show us how the working class attached meaning to the corporate gift differently from the managerial class. By linking their understanding to the Jajmani system, workers demonstrate a particular cultural perspective and world view. Cross does not suggest that the corporate gift is akin to the Jajmani system. It might however work as the means of unpacking the cultural meanings of the gift for the workers. While receiving the gift, workers were referred to by a name and not just a number and this for them was a significant moment of social recognition. This could be seen as corporate hegemony or false consciousness but Cross insists that much more is at work. It is important to acknowledge how even in the most exploitative conditions, workers seek to make a life for themselves.

With regard to the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) readings by Shamir and Rajak, the class acknowledged that capital has been continuously working towards recognising and co-opting newer discourses and resistances. Capitalism seems to have the ability to absorb and domesticate all forms of opposition within itself, and so today ‘doing good’ has become a market opportunity. It is important also to recognise that CSR has moved away from old fashioned philanthropy as demonstrated by the governance approach of World Bank reports which emphasise risks and opportunities.

Shamirs’ piece talked about how capital has taken over the role of the state and civil society leading to the emergence of ‘governance’ that encourages individuals to learn to ‘play the game’ in terms of neo-liberal rationality. Those that fall outside of this dominant discourse seem to get marginalised. However, a significant question remained where criticality can come from if all critical language is appropriated and made digestible to the mainstream? The class also acknowledged that these set of readings were not critical of the premise or ideology on which CSR is based.

Neo-liberal rationality that privileges the idea of governance seems to reduce the idea of the social and make the individual the agent of all forms of policy and practice. There is thus in policy discourse a de-politicisation and de-socialisation reducing the agenda merely to the cognitive and behavioural. In the process, the idea of the 'social being' seems erased. The focus of multi-lateral agencies is on understanding how individuals can be made to ‘follow’ policy.

The critical question we were left with was whether, despite the ability of neo-liberal logic to subsume resistances, the space for criticality remains.

- Keya and Savitha






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Session 13 class discussion - intellectual and cultural property

We opened our discussion with introductory remarks on the session readings noting how most of them (especially Hann) are attempts to situate anthropological discourse on property within the framework of legal theory. This legal discourse separates the individual from the social and we theoretically located this split in the moment that marked the demise of communal property rights and the subsequent rise of the possessive individual. Possessive individualism, we debated was a by-product of industrial revolution in Europe, specifically England. Before such legal institutionalization, property rights were subsumed within kinship systems and relations and individuals did not have independent identities outside of these systems. Ideas of ownership and property claims made within such systems did not rest with ‘autonomous individuals’ as conceptualized by post industrial revolution Western legal discourse. Thus, disposability as one such right of the individual in relation to property is connected more with a post industrial conception of the term. Finally that the notion of ‘individual’ as conceptualized by legal theoretical discourse was in effect ‘dividual’ and property claims made by such ‘dividuals’ were considered ‘bundle of rights’ in objects around them.

The discussion focus then shifted from classical ideas of property and property relations in the context of intellectual and cultural property to circulation and exchange. Property captures people’s relation between themselves and their material environment and thus plays an instrumental role in their attempts at self definition. We also discussed how earlier theoretical engagements with property were always on land whereas contemporary debates on intellectual and cultural property stretches the confines of such boundaries. Property claims and relations in the contemporary world primarily appear to be hegemonic and understood as either hindrances to or promoters of capitalism. We also spoke about how these new notions of IP / CP could be placed within the operational logic of capitalism and seen as powerful capitalist attempts to lay claims over the resources of the third world / Global South and bring them within the capitalist circuit of distribution and exchange of goods, commodities and resources.

 In the second half of the session we engaged with the question of territory and land and discussed how territory was much more than land. In trying to understand this ‘much more’, we grappled with the questions ‘what is territory?’ and ‘how is it different from land?’ Thus how does one attempt to understand territorial claims or cultural claims to territory within a broad and diffused notion of land? In this context we briefly referred to indigenous struggles for rights over land and territory in the face of State oppression and how property claims by indigenous communities seem to be different from territorial claims over land. The questions we asked ourselves while debating this difference were - Is there a difference between notions of place and territory? Can we say a nation state has property rights over its territory? Does a nation state have dispositionary rights over territory? Is territory an abstract concept in contrast with land which appears to be more concrete?

Krupa & Rashmi